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4Introduction: Moral Neutrality?
I believe that we have an opportunity of fulfilling our high destiny and
proving our loyalty and devotion to things higher than material property
and political considerations.1
James Dillon
Speech to Dail Eireann, July 17, 1941
Any person living in the current moment who makes even a slight attempt at 
staying abreast of world events cannot help but be confronted with information about two 
wars. The first is the situation in Iraq, an ongoing struggle which appears as if it will be 
grabbing headlines – and, perhaps more important, fueling heated debates on cable news 
channels – for quite some time. The second, thanks in large part to the 2004 campaign for 
President of the United States, is the war which took place in Vietnam more than three 
decades ago. Vietnam has been an issue in every presidential campaign since Lyndon B. 
Johnson declined to run for reelection in 1968, so it is not surprising that some of 2004’s 
loftiest rhetoric and dirtiest accusations centered on something that happened in the 
jungles of Southeast Asia before members of the much-talked -about “young voter” bloc 
were even born.
Vietnam has become an even more loaded topic for another reason, though. As at 
least a partial military failure for America – some would say a complete failure –
Vietnam sprang immediately to many people’s minds when talk began of being bogged 
down in Iraq with no exit strategy. A drastically overmatched opponent which hurts the 
overpowering U.S. force with guerilla techniques and a murky, questionable rationale for 
being there in the first place were just a couple of the more apparent similarities of the 
two military actions. Of course, many of those making these observations were far from 
5objective, and Vietnam comparisons were often more a tool used by opponents of the 
Iraq War than a basis for productive conversation and debate. There is one undeniable 
similarity between the two wars, however: multiple parties claim the moral high ground 
when it comes to each.
The wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the first notoriously misunderstood and the second 
seemingly destined to become so, can be explained in part by what they are not: clear-cut 
struggles between two enemies, one good and the other evil. One might reply that it 
would be naïve to construe any military conflict in such a simple fashion. Yet, World 
War II, which took place just a couple decades before the Vietnam War, is largely 
regarded as such in the popular memory (or imagination for those who were not alive 
when it took place). 
 Europe’s Second Great War, pitting the mostly democratic Allies against the 
fascist Axis powers, is held up as the shining example of a just and necessary war. Even 
among the most ardent anti-war protestors of the 1960’s or today, one imagines it would 
be difficult to find someone to speak up against the Allies’ decision to fight. The Allies 
are seen as heroic, sacrificing the lives of their brave young men in defense of freedom, 
quite literally saving the world. The Axis powers, with faces like Adolf Hitler and Benito 
Mussolini, are the opposite: cruel, evil aggressors bent on domination no matter how 
many people had to die, even killing innocents for non-military purpsoses.
The view of World War II as an epic struggle of good against evil is not totally 
untrue. The world is almost undoubtedly better off thanks to the dreadful violence which 
took place in Europe, Africa, and Asia from 1939 to 1945. It is almost unbelievable how 
evil the Nazis were, how much they got away with and how much more they could have 
6done had their military not been crushed. Of course, there are also the atrocities 
committed by the “good guys” which are often glossed over in order to make a better 
story – the carpet-bombings which set flame to factories, military bases, hospitals, and 
homes alike in German cities; the sickening (if not one-sided) cruelty to Japanese 
soldiers, who Western militaries were taught to think of as less than human; the 
instantaneous, indiscriminate killing unleashed on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by two 
atomic bombs which were of questionable necessity.
Nonetheless, World War II is overwhelmingly seen, with some reason, as a black-
and-white issue. It is as easy to tell the "good guys" from the "bad guys" in the Second 
Great War as in any other major modern conflict. The Allies may have made some 
mistakes along the way, but in the end they achieved one of the great victories of human 
history: freedom beat oppression, democracy beat fascism, good beat evil.
While working on this paper, I had many conversations about it with family and 
friends. When people heard that I was writing a thesis, they generally asked, out of 
curiosity, what it would be about. I would respond that I was interested in Ireland’s 
decision to remain neutral in World War II. The response was, almost universally, some 
variation on “They did?”
Clearly, my family and friends have not studied their Irish history too carefully . 
More important, however, is that they simply assumed Ireland must have taken part in the 
war. Why would they not? How could they not? While a country’s decision not to 
participate in Iraq is generally seen as a political decision made for the good of that 
country, Ireland’s decision not to join the Allies is instinctively seen as a moral failure. 
How could Great Britain’s direct neighbor sit on the sidelines while the English – not to 
7mention many Irish citizens – risked all to guarantee the survival of their homeland? How 
could a nation which is perhaps linked to its church and its faith more closely than any 
other allow such terrible things to take place on the continent without feeling the 
obligation to help out?
In the oversimplified way that many are tempted to consider the Second World 
War, there is no room for practical or political concerns. Surely, we believe, the 
overwhelming threat presented by the fascist states to people everywhere must have been 
obvious. Neutrality could not have been a viable option. Many political scientists, 
especially those who subscribe to realism, would be loath to suggest than any state would 
go to war out of anything other than self-interest. Countries go to war to maintain or 
increase their own security, they say. When it comes to World War II, however, this 
respected theory seems to disappear from mainstream discourse. Scholars who have 
suggested that the more rational realist decision for Britain would have been to find a 
way to coexist with Nazi Germany have their work laughed off as fantasy – it is 
unimaginable that the British would have done such a thing2. It is conveniently forgotten 
that the United States was pulled into the war by a spectacular attack on its own soil, not 
by any moral compulsion.
It is not up for debate that Ireland had very good practical reasons for staying out 
of the war. They had finally reclaimed their ports from the British, and the prospect of 
inviting Allied ships right back in was not an appealing one. Ireland’s armed forces were 
not ready to take part in a major conflict, and there was little appetite to invest the money 
and energy that would be needed for a rapid, substantial upgrade. The overwhelmingly 
Catholic country did not want to cooperate with the godless communists of the Soviet 
8Union, who were on the Allied side. They had less desire to team up with the English as 
long as partition was in effect. The opposition to fighting alongside Britain was 
significant in principle, but was even more important in practice. If Ireland’s government 
had consented to an alliance with England, it is quite possible that the Irish Republican 
Army would have attempted to forcibly overthrow them, potentially igniting another civil 
war.
Any of these factors would have made participation in the war an unattractive 
option for Ireland. The combination of all of them meant that, for the government leaders, 
declaring war may have meant the end of their political lives – if not their actual lives. 
John A. Murphy argues that, in historical perspective, neutrality was the “only feasible 
policy” for Ireland.3
When James Dillon spoke of Ireland fulfilling its “high destiny,” it was in the 
context of a courageous, if politically unwise, speech attacking Ireland’s policy of 
neutrality. The above quotation, though, is interesting because it could have just as easily 
found its way into a speech by one of neutrality’s many impassioned supporters. While 
the Irish government may have chosen the policy of neutrality based in part on things like 
“material property and political considerations,” it rarely spoke about neutrality in this 
way. Eamon de Valera, taoiseach throughout the war and one of the country’s greatest 
leaders, talked of his approach to “the Emergency,” as the war was called in Ireland, in 
terms of morality and religion, not pragmatism.
Ireland’s leaders were similar to those of other countries in that they, too, saw the 
war as a question of right and wrong. Their answer to this question did not involve 
deciding which side was right and which was wrong, though. Rather, both the Allies and 
9the Axis were wrong. Ireland was right. It was right not to sink to violent means to solve 
problems which could be dealt with diplomatically. Ireland did not see itself just as 
separate from what was going on in Europe – it saw itself as above the fray. The Nazis 
were wrong for invading neighboring countries, but the Allies were no better. They were 
doing just as much of the killing, and when England, Ireland’s oppressor, and the Soviet 
Union, Christianity’s enemy, were joining forces, their motives were certainly not to be 
trusted.
De Valera and his colleagues decided that Ireland should practice not just military 
neutrality when it came to the two opposing sides, but moral neutrality as well. 
Individuals could not be stopped from having personal sympathies, of course, but as a 
nation Ireland’s public stance would be that one side was not better than the other. De 
Valera constantly spoke of neutrality as the will of the people and hinted that God had 
chosen them to stand apart from the violence as an example. It was made quite explicit 
that the government had not made a decision based on political expediency, but instead 
Ireland as a whole had made a decision based on its conscience.
War-time censorship was introduced in Ireland to protect both military and moral 
neutrality. The censorship administration went to great lengths to assure absolute even-
handedness in the way war information was distributed in their country. Newspaper 
reports of battles were balanced, cold, and without interpretation, often comprising little 
more than official communiqués from the belligerents. Newsreels on the war were 
banned completely because of the inherently emotional nature of such visuals. Also 
banned were films which the censors thought supported one side or the other, including 
works of great artistic merit such as “Casablanca.” Even weather forecasts were 
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eliminated from Irish papers, so as not to give out information that could be valuable for 
planning troop movements.
Censorship was quite effective in keeping the media from saying anything that 
could have angered either side in the war. “We are not going to have the newspapers 
transferring the fight to our doorstep,” proclaimed controller of censorship Thomas 
Coyne.4 Though the notion that newspapers, or even films, had the power to do such 
harm is questionable, Coyne and his colleagues did achieve their goal.
There is another aspect of Irish censorship which must be considered, however. 
This is its effect on moral neutrality. Eamon de Valera realized and accepted that some of 
his country’s citizens would naturally feel a connection to the Allies or Axis powers and 
thus would hope for their victory. Censorship made certain, though, that the people of 
Ireland had little more to go on than personal feelings and opinions. Newspapers were not 
free to give opinions. The Irish could not view film of the war or even many photographs 
which might have allowed them to form an opinion. Even the facts that they received
relied mainly on official accounts and statistics, with little to no analysis from experts. 
The conscience of Ireland may have felt its role as a neutral was acceptable, or right, or 
perhaps even destined. This conscience was perhaps as firm in its convictions as de 
Valera claimed, but it was also operating without the essentials necessary to form an 
informed opinion.
In this paper I will examine the ways in which the language of morality was used, 
and at other times censored, to define Irish neutrality during the Second World War. I 
will argue that the Irish people’s perception of the government’s policy as morally right 
was important in their decision to support it. They believed in neutrality for reasons of 
11
principle, not pragmatism; however, their judgment was necessarily based on, and 
reinforced by, the information that was available to them. This information was not a fair 
or accurate reflection of the war. Through speeches and censorship, Eamon de Valera and 
his fellow champions of neutrality intentionally and successfully created a situation of 
moral neutrality in Ireland which made it possible for the policy to be regarded not as a 
smart-but-selfish political move but rather as a patriotic and virtuous action which was 
good for Ireland and good for the world.
There are various ways of looking at this issue. One is by an examination of just 
how censorship affected Ireland’s media during the war. The primary example used here 
will be the Irish Times. A traditionally pro-British paper, the Times backed de Valera on 
neutrality for practical reasons, but strongly supported the Allies on moral and emotional 
grounds. The paper was passionate in its opposition to censorship, frequently trying to 
find ways to sneak around it but thereby drawing the strictest government attention of any 
newspaper in Ireland. I will look at the Irish Times in order to show how censorship made 
a staunchly and eloquently pro-Ally paper into a source of dry facts which gave readers 
little help in thinking about right or wrong as they applied to the war.
On the other end of the spectrum was the taoiseach, Eamon de Valera. An 
intelligent man and gifted speaker, Dev truly became the voice of Ireland during the war 
years. His speeches were printed word-for-word in the newspapers and he was rarely 
criticized. Overwhelmingly popular, his views on the war generally became Ireland’s 
views on the war with little change or even analysis in-between. De Valera felt very 
badly about what was going on in Europe, even expressing great sympathy for the British 
and the unionists of Northern Ireland. But he believed that neutrality, not participation, 
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was the answer. While his public speeches did not ignore the practical aspects of 
neutrality, they did a great deal to convince the people of Ireland that the decision they 
had made was the right one on an ethical level.
De Valera, not surprisingly, often spoke of God when he spoke of the Emergency. 
In a country defined in large part by its brand of Catholicism, religion certainly played a 
role in a decision as monumental as whether to become involved in a war or not. Doing 
the moral thing meant doing what God wanted. Therefore, both supporters and opponents 
of neutrality were quick to speak about God when the issue of the war came up. 
Politicians invoking God’s name was one thing, but the influence of the Catholic Church 
may have been even more vital to the formation of public opinion. Even the speech of the 
Church, though, was not protected from Irish censorship. The Irish people's experience of 
the war, both through their religion and through other aspects of their lives, will be 
examined to make a final determination on whether neutrality was truly their will.
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Eamon de Valera: Architect of Irish Neutrality
During the middle of the twentieth century, one man represented the face of 
Ireland to the world. That man was Eamon de Valera, who dominated national politics as 
either Head of the Irish Government or Leader of the Opposition for over forty years 
before “retiring” to the Presidency in 1959.
De Valera was one of the Republic’s most respected and beloved politicians. A 
figure of national renown from his youth and a popular leader, his importance only grew 
during World War II. As the most visible representative of the government, his voice 
became in large measure the voice of the nation. With a censorship program in place 
which kept the media from criticizing the government’s policy of neutrality or doing 
anything to undermine it, de Valera’s decisions, and the rationale for them, were 
delivered to the public without alteration or analysis. It was the taoiseach who provided 
the answers to the people’s questions about the war, and if others who were traditionally 
in positions of influence felt those answers were incorrect, there was now little they could 
say or do about it.
Eamon de Valera certainly believed in doing what was best for Ireland. But he 
believed in neutrality for deeper reasons. It was, he admitted, the best practical policy 
given the circumstances facing the country at the time. But neutrality, to him, was more 
than that. It was the right thing to do. It was willed by God. It was what, deep down, the 
Irish people wanted.
Dev understood from the beginning the importance public conscience would play 
in any modern war. He truly believed in both the practical and moral correctness of 
neutrality, and he realized that if his chosen policy were going to work, it needed to be 
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supported by the people. If that meant using censorship and the position of unparalleled 
authority he held to shape the public conscience in the way that he wanted to, that is what 
the taoiseach would do.
There were plenty of sound, practical reasons for Eamon de Valera to keep his 
country out of Europe’s affairs during “The Emergency,” or World War II as it would
come to be known outside of Ireland. His military was far from prepared to undertake 
major actions, nor was there much it would be able to do if an opponent decided to bomb 
the cities of Ireland. The money and manpower which would be necessary to quickly get 
the Irish military into fighting shape would require sacrifices which would not be easy, or 
pleasant, to make.
Of course, it was never a real possibility that Ireland would join the Axis powers 
and officially take up arms against Britain. There were hard feelings toward the English 
among the Irish people, and some undoubtedly hoped that the Brits would be defeated by 
Germany and Italy. But privately de Valera recognized that an Allied victory would be 
better for Ireland and the world. Censorship assured total impartiality in public, and the 
taoiseach was disciplined, sticking to this dictate relatively firmly in his own speeches. 
Behind the scenes, however, Ireland did what it could do – and could get away with – to 
help the Allies. For instance, while newspapers were not allowed to print weather 
forecasts because this information could be of potential military use to one side or the 
other, the government was in fact giving detailed forecasts directly to the British, along 
with whatever other helpful intelligence they possessed.
R.M. Smyllie, the firebrand editor of the Irish Times and impassioned anti-
censorship crusader, made the argument that Ireland’s pro-British neutrality actually did 
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more to help the Allies’ cause than full-on participation in the war would have. His 
argument was more than the rationalization of an admitted Anglophile. Smyllie argued 
that if Ireland had joined the Allies on the fields of battle, it would have given the 
Germans every right to invade the island nation. The Axis powers undoubtedly possessed 
the military might to overwhelm Ireland, and doing so successfully would have put their 
forces on Britain’s doorstep. De Valera was aware of this possibility – with the state of 
Ireland’s military, inviting a probable attack would have been, at best, an irresponsible 
decision by the man charged with protecting his nation.
The problems with entering the war as Britain’s ally did not end there. Ireland had 
just won a hard-fought moral and political victory in which it finally convinced the 
English government to pull their ships out of Irish ports, giving the Republic full 
autonomy over them. A decision to openly support the Allies, even if it came without a 
commitment of manpower, would likely lead to a strong request that Ireland allow British 
warships back into its ports. The Irish cannot be blamed if this was an unappealing 
prospect; they did not trust their more powerful neighbors to live up to agreements, with 
good reason, and reopening their ports to English ships might lead to a more permanent 
British control over Irish harbors or even encourage other incursions on the Republic’s 
hard-won sovereignty.
The Irish people’s mindset could not be ignored by their leaders. De Valera knew 
that, for most of his people, forgiving and forgetting the wrongs that England had done 
them in order to form an alliance was not an option. Unification with the six counties of 
Northern Ireland, which had remained a part of Britain, was still the foremost political 
issue in the minds of many Irishmen. Notable among them were the members of the Irish 
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Republican Army, who saw themselves as being at war with England. If Ireland’s own 
government were to join an alliance with their enemies, the IRA likely would have 
viewed these leaders as surrendering their legitimacy; some members already believed 
that de Valera’s stance toward the English had become much too friendly.1 An alliance 
with Britain may have set off a civil war within Ireland in which those most vehemently 
opposed to England would have attempted to overthrow the government – and quite 
possibly could have succeeded.
In his article “Unneutral Ireland: An Ambivalent and Unique Security Policy,” 
Trevor C. Salmon examines the evidence regarding Ireland’s status during World War II 
and comes to the rather harsh conclusion that it “turns out on examination to be not so 
much principled neutrality as unprincipled non-belligerency, the determination to stay out 
of war at any cost without regard for the upholding of neutral rights or the fulfilling of 
neutral duties.”2 Salmon’s condemnation of Eamon de Valera’s policy as “unprincipled” 
misses some crucial points. While it was insincere for Ireland to compare itself to 
traditional neutrals like Switzerland while not making the sacrifices necessary to build up 
a military that could defend its own borders as the Swiss did, de Valera’s stance toward 
the war was not born out of cold, realistic political calculations alone.
De Valera did not deny the existence of many practical reasons for clinging to 
neutrality. In a speech delivered at Cork a week after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, 
the taoiseach was uncharacteristically open about the pragmatic side of Irish neutrality:
From the moment this war began, there was for this State only one policy
possible – neutrality. Our circumstances, our history, the incompleteness of
our national freedom through the partition of our country, made any other
policy impracticable. Any other policy would have divided our people, and
for a divided nation to fling itself into this war would be to commit suicide.
Of necessity, we adopted the policy of neutrality.3
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It seems probable that it was sympathy for the United States, which had just endured a 
devastating sneak attack, and perhaps some guilt at Ireland’s failure to lend military 
assistance to its closest friend, that inspired this honesty in de Valera. He nearly always 
spoke of neutrality as the best policy for Ireland, his people’s chosen policy – not the 
only possible one, the practical one, the necessary one. Still, the taoiseach could not resist 
a return to his normal tactic of defending neutrality as morally right before this same 
speech was over. “The course we have followed is a just course,” said de Valera, “God 
has been pleased to save us during the years of war that have already passed. We pray 
that he may be pleased to save us to the end.”4
De Valera’s public statements regarding Ireland’s policy of neutrality generally 
emphasized two points: that neutrality was the will of the people, and that they were right 
to will it. It was both the best thing for Ireland and the best thing the people could do 
morally. They were setting an example for the rest of the world which God had destined 
them to set.
De Valera’s thoughts about Ireland and neutrality did not start with Hitler’s 
invasion of Poland. He was of the belief that nearly all modern conflicts could be solved 
through diplomacy and compromise and that violence as a means of solving international 
disputes should, at this stage of Europe’s development, be largely unnecessary. Dev 
brought this set of beliefs to the office of President of the Assembly of the League of 
Nations, a post he accepted in 1938. He gave a radio broadcast entitled “Peace or War?” a 
couple weeks after taking office:
The war of sheer aggression, the war of the bully who covets what does
not belong to him and means to possess himself of it by force, is not the war
that we need fear most. The most dangerous war is that which has its origin
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in just claims denied or in a clash of opposing rights – and not merely
opposing interests – when each side can see no reason in justice why it
should yield its claim to the other. If, by conceding the claims of justice or
by reasonable compromise in a spirit of fair play, we take steps to avoid the
latter kind of war, we can face the possibility of the other kind with relative
equanimity. Despite certain preaching, mankind has advanced.5
De Valera’s powers of prediction were far from their peak at this moment. But the 
speech is notable for another reason. Just a year before Hitler’s storm troopers marched 
into Poland, Dev strongly believed that Ireland would not have to involve itself in a full-
scale war any time soon. He made no attempt to hide the fact that he intended for Ireland 
to stay neutral for the foreseeable future, even before a second great war threatened to 
tear apart the continent of Europe.
De Valera’s address to the Dail Eireann in the days after the Nazis stormed into 
Poland, then, was not surprising. “We want to be neutral,” he told the legislators. “It is 
only natural that, as human beings, we should judge the situation and, having formed a 
judgement, sympathise with one side or the other,” said the taoiseach, “but I do not think 
that anybody, no matter what his feelings might be, would suggest that the Government 
policy, the official policy of the State, should be other than what the Government would 
suggest.”6
A year later, Dev had learned that speaking of neutrality as the “policy of the 
State” or the government was not the best way to defend it. In November 1940, the 
taoiseach stated in the Dail that neutrality “is the policy which has been accepted not just 
by this house but by our people as a whole.”7 In a 1941 St.Patrick’s Day radio address 
aimed at Irish-Americans, de Valera called neutrality “the determined will of our 
people.”8 Less than a month after that, he claimed that “as a people we have made our 
will so manifest that no one could mistake it.”9 In a relatively short period of time, 
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neutrality had gone from his policy to the government’s policy to the Irish people’s 
policy.
Eamon de Valera was not content that the Irish people give their consent to the 
nation’s policy of neutrality. He wanted them to embrace it as their destiny, a God-given 
moral duty to show the warring countries that it was possible to rise above the violence 
that had tormented Europe for centuries. In October 1941, an article in the Irish Times
showed the chosen-people role which Dev believed the Irish to have in a world at war: 
‘For two years,’ he said, ‘God has mercifully saved us from being directly 
involved in this savage war which has brought death and misery to so
many nations’…‘We have no right to expect him to do so [save us] if we
do not help ourselves in the natural order which He has ordained.’10
Ireland was not hiding from anything by remaining neutral, de Valera’s public
statements insisted. Their policy was a morally courageous one. The Irish people “would 
strain themselves to the utmost…to see that no nation suffered because of their freedom,” 
the taoiseach insisted at the war’s commencement.11 De Valera portrayed neutrality as 
logically flowing from the Easter Rising in a radio broadcast commemorating that event’s 
twenty-fifth anniversary: “Thanks to the men whose memory we have been honouring 
today, we, the first generation in centuries, have a freedom which is worth 
defending…we should shirk no sacrifice which may be demanded of us in its defense.”12
To Dev, the people of Ireland were protecting their freedom by not taking part in the war, 
and thereby asserting their independence.
In Winston Churchill’s V-E Day address, he could not help but take a couple 
minutes away from celebrating his nation’s valor to point out that the victory came no 
thanks to Ireland, which had sat on the sidelines throughout the war. His implication, of 
course, was that the decision was borne of weakness and selfishness, not a spirit of 
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independence and morality. De Valera responded eloquently on behalf of his people three 
days later, with equal measures of restraint and grace:
Mr. Churchill is proud of Britain’s stand alone, after France had fallen and
before America entered the war.
Could he not find in his heart the generosity to acknowledge that there is a
small nation that stood alone, not for one year or two, but for several hundred 
years against aggression; that endured spoliations, famines, massacres in
endless succession; that was clubbed many times into insensibility, but that
each time, on returning consciousness, took up the fight anew; a small nation
that could never be got to accept defeat and has never surrendered her soul?
Mr. Churchill is justly proud of his nation’s perseverance against heavy odds.
But we in this island are still prouder of our people’s perseverance for 
freedom through all the centuries. We of our time have played a part in that
perseverance.13
Eamon de Valera understood the importance of public opinion. Despite the
suggestions of some of his opponents, he was not a dictator. He realized that the support 
of the people was necessary in order to be an effective politician, and also, it seems, 
wanted that support as much as he needed it. De Valera viewed himself as truly 
representing the best interests of the Irish republic and wanted, with good reason, to be 
seen that way by others. So as he had developed a firm belief in neutrality at the start of 
the Second World War, Dev wanted not just to find a way to impose that policy on 
Ireland but a way to make it the people’s policy, a plan that would be not just accepted 
but defended and supported with pride.
De Valera was aware of the effect public conscience could have on the success of 
any policy, even something as major as a military campaign. In the radio broadcast 
mentioned earlier, in which de Valera asserted that the war of “opposing rights” should 
be more worrisome to the nations of Europe than the war of “the bully who covets what 
does not belong to him,” one reason he gave to defend this thesis was that “the public 
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conscience, in a clear case of aggression, will count and may well be, in a European war, 
a decisive factor.”14
Given Ireland’s experience of World War II, this 1938 speech is fascinating to 
look back on. Most obviously, it appears that de Valera was mentally unprepared for 
exactly the type of war that would be raging across the continent within a few short years. 
Speaking from his position as President of the Assembly of the League of Nations, Dev 
gave an apt description of the war which would be carried out by Hitler and Mussolini, 
only in predicting that it would not happen. The nationalist leaders of Germany and Italy 
were undoubtedly bullies, and attempted to take, by force, what did not belong to them. 
Few would argue that Germany had a legitimate right to spread out across the lands that 
Hitler believed they had a claim to. It seems highly doubtful that de Valera could have 
seen the World War II conflict as one between two combatants who each had a justifiable 
claim to the same piece of territory.
It is exponentially more likely that de Valera was committed to the policy of 
neutrality even if the war was not one of “opposing rights.” The taoiseach made it clear 
before the war began that it was his desire to see Ireland stay out of foreign 
entanglements so it could focus on its own problems, notably the struggle to unify the 
independent counties with those which were still a part of England. “The Irish people did 
not want to be dragged into any European or other war,” admitted de Valera in front of 
the Dail as it was becoming clear that a second great war was inevitable, “We want to be 
neutral.”15 In these short lines the taoiseach is frank – Ireland, under his watch, will not 
get involved in a war if it can be avoided. While in the same speech Dev does assure his 
listeners that the Irish “would strain themselves to the utmost…to see that no nation 
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suffered because of their freedom,” this disclaimer is vague enough so as not to guarantee 
Irish participation under any particular set of circumstances.
The imposition of censorship was a sign that the Irish government took neutrality 
seriously. While Ireland might fail to live up to the ideals set for neutral nations by 
traditional neutrals like Switzerland and Sweden – most notably, building up a military 
strong enough to protect one’s own borders against aggressors – it would make sure that 
it was quite neutral in its public discourse.
The government realized that its lack of adequate defense forces and its 
geographical position on England’s doorstep made its status as a neutral quite precarious. 
For one, the Germans could decide to invade Ireland in order to use it as a staging ground 
for attacks on Britain. Or the proximity to England and the strong connections many Irish 
felt with Britain – they may not have liked the English government, but many worked and 
lived there at various times or knew someone who did, especially once the war-time 
economy geared up – would become an inescapable motivation for joining the war. The 
realness of this threat is evidenced by the number of young Irishmen who did volunteer to 
serve in the British armed forces during the Second World War. John A. Murphy cites 
evidence that there may have been 50,000 volunteers from the independent Irish republic 
who fought alongside the English during the war; Geoffrey Roberts estimates the figure 
as 70,000.16 Either way, this is a number that is not easy to ignore. De Valera 
acknowledged that each individual would naturally have his or her own sympathies, but 
clearly there were many Irish people with very strong sympathies – ones they would risk 
their own lives for – in favor of the Allied forces.
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The Irish Times, Dublin’s premier daily newspaper, was in the same camp as 
these volunteers – it accepted Irish neutrality but wanted to do what it could to help the 
Allies’ cause. How would it look to the Germans or Italians if Ireland’s newspapers were 
reporting the war with a pro-British slant, revealing atrocities committed by the Axis 
forces in words or, worse, pictures? What if a radio program, magazine, film, or newsreel 
did the same thing, presenting information that, intentionally or unintentionally, showed 
one side as good and sympathetic and the other as evil and loathsome? While it is 
unlikely that a newspaper article or film showing could incite enough genuine anger in 
the Germans to cause them to mobilize their forces to attack Ireland, it might give them 
an excuse if an attack was something which they saw as militarily expedient.
This was the stated reason for censorship in Ireland. Bias on the part of the media 
was not only improper, it was dangerous to the nation, said the government. Therefore, 
the Allies and the Axis powers were to be treated respectfully and even-handedly by the 
newspapers. If a newsreel or a movie displayed bias towards one side in the conflict –
newsreels were nearly always laced with Allied propaganda, as they generally came from 
Britain – they would simply not be shown. Censorship was carried out forcefully –
perhaps more so than de Valera intended. Those charged with carrying out censorship 
were serious, accomplished, dedicated men who, in order not to slip up, operated under a 
policy of disallowing anything which raised any suspicion of bias towards one side or the 
other. Often, the effect was that nothing good or bad, of real importance at least, could be 
said about either side.
Was the fear that a belligerent would be motivated, or gain an excuse, to attack 
Ireland because of something in a newspaper or on the radio the only reason for the strict 
24
censorship regime? Given the way Eamon de Valera understood and valued the public 
conscience, it would be ignorant to believe the shaping of the Irish people’s opinion was 
not a factor in imposing censorship.
Many of the people of Ireland would have been susceptible to the influence of 
pro-Ally information, especially when it became America’s war and not just Britain’s. 
The Irish people did not want to feel that they were being weak by maintaining a neutral 
stance toward the great war which was taking place not too far away from their own 
borders. Supporters of the Allied cause both within and outside Ireland would 
undoubtedly have appealed to their Catholic morality, their manhood, and their friendship 
with America in trying to convince them to join the cause. If these messages, even in a 
subtle form, were delivered to the Irish people on a consistent basis, they may have begun 
to wonder if neutrality was really their policy or just that of their government.
De Valera was aware that the best way to present neutrality both in Ireland and to 
other leaders throughout the world was as the policy of the people, not his own political 
preference. The idea of neutrality as the will of the people was not unfounded. Neutrality 
meant standing up to the British on behalf of Irish independence – staying out of the war 
was a way of proving that England could not tell them what to do. It also meant that the 
nation would not have to sacrifice its young men and its resources to do a job which the 
English had chosen to take upon themselves.
According to de Valera, neutrality meant more than these things, important as 
they were. It was a courageous step out of line, a continuation of the struggle for an 
independent Ireland which the people had been fighting for generations, a morally right 
act which would show other nations that peaceful, diplomatic responses could be 
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effective, a decision for Ireland which had been made by God, not by man. In various 
speeches during the Emergency years, the taoiseach described the policy of Irish 
neutrality in all these ways.
Censorship assured that the way de Valera chose to present the war was the way 
in which most all Irish people would hear about it. Their morning newspaper might give 
them the facts about where the battles were taking place and how many men had been 
killed, but if they were looking for any sort of moral meaning behind the facts and 
figures, it would be Dev who would give it to them. There was no right or wrong in the 
media’s descriptions of the war. The answer to who was right came from the government: 
neither the Allies nor the Axis powers was right, as both were doing what was morally 
wrong in order to win at the expense of the other. Ireland, on the other hand, had risen 
above this barbaric behavior and avoided the death and destruction it brought, thanks to 
the grace of God, or so de Valera felt and said.
It is likely that many of Ireland’s people would have supported Dev and his policy 
of neutrality even if their will had been tested by a flood of information telling them they 
were wrong and trying to convince them to change their ways. Censorship meant, 
however, that this surge of information, whether propaganda or simply well-meaning 
opinion pieces, never came. Those who believed that neutrality was the right thing to do, 
both practically and morally, had their opinion reinforced. Those who disagreed could go 
fight for one side or the other if they wished, but they would have a difficult time 
spreading their views at home. Those who were somewhere in the middle very likely 
could have been swayed towards supporting neutrality because it was the only view 
which was presented with any passion or moral backing in the media. If neutrality was 
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the will of the people, the fact that their other options could not be presented persuasively 
probably had something to do with it.
Eamon de Valera’s commitment to Irish neutrality is unquestionable. Although he 
clearly supported the Allied cause behind the scenes, he was willing to go to shocking 
lengths to maintain absolute public neutrality. This is shown most clearly by his famous –
some would say infamous – visit to the German ministry in Ireland to offer his official 
condolences upon the death of Adolf Hitler.
As a neutral country, Ireland should treat the warring nations on both sides with 
equal respect, de Valera believed. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt passed away on 
April 12, 1945, Dev responded by sending a warm, heartfelt message of sympathy to 
Harry Truman and adjourning the Dail Eireann for the day out of respect. When Hitler 
died less than three weeks later, the taoiseach made a formal call of condolence on the 
German Minister. This move outraged the people of the Allied countries more than 
anything else de Valera or Ireland had done during the course of World War II. The truth 
about Nazi death camps, which had been liberated by Allied troops, was now being 
revealed to the world. It was becoming clear just how evil Hitler’s regime truly was. Yet, 
this did not stop de Valera from paying his respects.
It is possible that, in part, de Valera did so to spite the United States and 
particularly its ambassador, David Gray. The two men had a terrible relationship, one 
which did substantial damage to Irish-American affairs. Gray believed that Ireland’s 
decision to maintain diplomatic relations with the Axis powers made them unworthy of 
the United States government’s trust. After the war was virtually won in Europe and 
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Roosevelt had died, Gray made clear his distrust and suspicions of the Irish government. 
Tim Pat Coogan writes of this in Ireland in the Twentieth Century:
Gray returned to the charge against the Axis diplomats shortly after 
Roosevelt died. Having failed to ensure that what he termed ‘Axis war 
criminals’ would not be given asylum in Ireland after the war, he demanded
that the keys of the German legation be handed over to him to prevent the 
Germans destroying archive material which he claimed contained
intelligence on submarine warfare…[de Valera] was courteous, but Gray
reported that he was evidently angered and ‘grew red.’17
It was only two days later that de Valera made his visit of condolence. He himself 
hinted that his feelings toward Gray, as compared to the German minister, may have been 
a factor. “So long as we retained our diplomatic relations with Germany, to have failed to 
call upon the German representative would have been an act of unpardonable discourtesy 
to the German nation and to Dr Hempel himself,” said de Valera. “During the whole of 
the war, Dr Hempel’s conduct was irreproachable. He was always friendly and invariably 
correct – in marked contrast with Gray.”18
While making a statement about how the American minister – supposedly a friend 
– had treated Ireland during the war may have been part of de Valera’s motivation, much 
more important was his commitment to neutrality. He refused to publicly show any bias 
towards one side or the other, even now that it was clear who the victor would be. “My 
call on the German Minister on the announcement of Hitler’s death was played up to the 
utmost,” de Valera noted in a letter to an American friend, “I expected this. I could have 
had a diplomatic illness but, as you know, I would scorn that sort of thing.” He went on:
It is of considerable importance that the formal acts of courtesy paid on such 
occasions as the death of a head of a State should not have attached to them
any further special significance, such as connoting approval or disapproval
of the policies of the state in question, or of its head. It is important that it
should never be inferred that these formal acts imply the passing of any 
judgments, good or bad.19
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De Valera’s feelings on this issue would seem to give a deeper view into
neutrality as a whole. His equal treatment of the deaths of Roosevelt and Hitler provide 
an example of the moral neutrality which Emergency Ireland strove for under his 
guidance. Dev almost certainly had very different personal feelings about the two men, 
and yet he treated both with similar measures of respect. He did not judge them morally 
and treat them by how good or bad he felt they were, but rather accepted that they were 
enemies and that it was not up to him to take a side. Rather than picking who was better 
and who worse, de Valera focused on doing what was right. In this case, it was offering 
the respect that is due a head of state. This was not a popular political decision by any 
means. Even in Ireland, Dev’s decision was passionately denounced by many of his 
countrymen. De Valera took advantage of an opportunity to solidify wavering support 
with his brilliant, moving reply to Churchill’s V-E Day jabs a few weeks later.
De Valera’s decision that Ireland would remain neutral, like his decision to offer 
formal condolences on the death of one of history’s most hated figures, was one of 
principle. He believed the step his nation was taking was courageous, morally right, and 
honorable in the eyes of God if not those outside of his country. There were, of course, 
convincing practical reasons to stay out of the European war as well, and these 
undeniably factored into the Irish government’s commitment to its policy. With that said, 
de Valera believed it was Ireland, and neither of the warring parties, who had the moral 
high ground. He wanted the people to believe that and be proud of it, and censorship was 
an effective tool in assuring that this was the case.
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The Irish Times and the Futile Fight Against Censorship
Controller of Censorship Thomas Coyne’s quip that his agency was “not going to 
have the newspapers transferring the fight to our doorstep,” quoted in the Introduction, 
may elicit a chuckle from the reader. The idea that a country involved in an all-out war 
would attack Ireland solely because of something written in one of its newspapers is at 
least somewhat dubious. Coyne was not joking, though. He and his colleagues had been 
assigned the task of assuring impartiality by the Irish media, and they took the order quite 
seriously.
The Fianna Fail government of Eamon de Valera decided that for Ireland to be 
truly neutral, it had to preserve neutrality in its public dialogue about the war. Both sides, 
the Allies and the Axis powers, must be treated with complete even-handedness in order 
to assure that Ireland would not violate this moral neutrality. The most effective way of 
making this happen was to keep the media from saying anything negative or positive 
about either side. The facts could be presented, but they could not be given emotional, 
personal, or moral context. The opponents would be presented as morally equal – and 
both less morally right than neutral Ireland.
When it came to Ireland’s newspapers – from the Dublin dailies to small-town 
weeklies – the censorship office operated under one overarching rule: “If there’s doubt, 
cut it out.”1 Weather forecasts vanished from the papers, and along with them went any 
mention of meteorological conditions in travel writing and even reports on sports games 
– one could read a story on a soccer match without ever learning whether it was played 
on a dry, sunny afternoon or whether the pitch was a mess of sloppy mud. 
Advertisements using war imagery were banned, even if they were in reference to no 
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particular conflict or a conflict that was clearly of a different place and time. While these 
examples are extreme, they go to show that in the minds of those doing the censoring, it 
was not difficult to raise doubt, reasonable or not.
Thus it is not surprising that the Irish Times quickly became the favorite target of 
the censors. The Times was known for its pro-British slant, which it made little effort to 
hide. “We were, as we still are, pro-British,” admitted a Times editorial after the war, on 
the first day after censorship was lifted, adding the newspaper’s belief that British 
democracy was “the highest achievement that yet has been made by man as a political 
being.”2 The goal of the censorship was for the two sides in World War II to be viewed as 
equal; the Times could not be counted on to treat them as such. “For years before the war 
we had made no secret of our hatred and contempt for the foul growths of Fascism and 
National Socialism that were stifling all freedom of thought and decency of living in the 
countries of their origin,” said the same editorial, entitled “Out of the Shadows.”3 The 
Times, a proud daily based in Dublin and geared toward the upper tiers of society, 
seemed more likely than any paper to push the boundaries of censorship. It did just this, 
but the censorship pushed back with the full force of the state behind it.
Censorship was undeniably bad for the newspapers. The better-safe-than-sorry 
approach meant that significant amounts of content could be pulled by the censors, 
leaving the newspapers with little to do but print fewer pages. Sometimes they did not 
even have time to make this adjustment, and tell-tale signs of censorship like blank 
columns or missing headlines would appear in that day’s edition. Less content meant 
fewer pages, and fewer pages less space to sell advertisements, which meant less money. 
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As the reader will see below, the censorship-era newspaper was also less appealing to 
readers, with dry, fact-heavy articles lacking much of any analysis.
While World War II censorship hit the newspapers where it hurt – in the wallet –
but this was not the only reason Irish Times editor R.M. Smyllie was opposed to the 
policy. Nor was his opposition to censorship based on a desire for Ireland to enter the 
war. Smyllie supported neutrality and, in fact, provided Taoiseach Eamon de Valera’s 
policy with some of its most intelligent, well-reasoned defenses. An unabashed 
Anglophile, “Bertie” Smyllie coined the term “unneutral neutral Eire” to describe 
Ireland’s position in war-time Europe. He argued that Ireland helped the Allies more by 
providing secret assistance than it would have by declaring war on the Axis powers. 
Smyllie claimed Irish participation in the conflict only would have invited an invasion by 
the Germans, who would have overrun the undermanned Irish military and found 
themselves on Britain’s doorstep.
Smyllie was a man of principle, and a man of strong opinions. For these reasons 
he was deeply angered by the censorship of his newspaper. “The freedom of the press is 
an integral part of the democratic system of government,” claimed the Irish Times in its 
May 11, 1945 editorial “Censorship,” a plea for an end to that policy now that the war 
was effectively over. “So soon as the government decides to curb or restrain that freedom 
of public expression, democratic ideals must begin to wilt.” Smyllie went further, directly 
criticizing Eamon de Valera, whom he believed to be ultimately responsible for the 
policy. “We believe that at heart, the Taoiseach is a democrat,” the Times wrote before 
adding, in understatement, “We confess that we are slightly concerned regarding his 
attitude toward the Press.”4 The editorial did not stop there, however. It also implicitly 
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compared Ireland’s government to those of the fascist powers which had just been 
defeated:
No nation can enjoy true freedom without an untrammeled Press. It is a
significant fact that, in almost every case of incipient dictatorship, almost
the first step to be taken by those who have coveted power has been the
establishment of a rigid control over the newspapers. The most notable
example, probably, has been that of Germany…5 (italics added)
The Irish Times kept at it the following day in “Out of the Shadows,” describing 
the war-time censorship as “an official discipline, in some respects as Draconian and 
irrational as anything that ever was devised in the fertile brain of the late Josef 
Goebbels.”6 Smyllie believed press censorship to be incompatible with democracy and 
therefore bad for Ireland. He did not waver in this belief before, during, or after the 
period of censorship. Nor did he save up his opposition to the policy for the forceful 
denouncements which his paper published after censorship ended. The government 
officials who operated the censorship did not take long to realize that Smyllie would 
challenge them constantly. Smyllie, in turn, took it upon himself to push the envelope, 
trying to make sure his newspaper reported on the war as accurately as possible but also, 
it seemed, carrying out a personal battle against the policy of censorship itself.
Smyllie attempted to trick the censors, sneaking information into the Irish Times
which would not have been allowed had it been noticed. The editor was especially 
incensed by the censors’ ruling that not even obituaries could mention the war, even if the 
deceased had been killed in battle (as many Irish volunteers were). The Irish Times
obituary pages began to feature a shocking amount of deaths by “lead poisoning” – this 
was the newspaper’s code for having been shot in the war. When a former Times worker 
now fighting for the Allies survived the sinking of his ship in battle, Smyllie could not 
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help but share that the man had, amazingly, managed to swim to shore after his recent 
“boating accident.”7 On May 8, 1945, V-E (Victory in Europe) Day, the front page of the 
Times featured, under the massive headline “PEACE TODAY IN EUROPE,” 
photographs of the faces of seven Allied leaders. They were arranged in the shape of a 
“V.” The victory was not just one for the Allies, but a small one for Smyllie over his 
nemeses in the censorship office.
R.M. Smyllie was Ireland’s most important anti-censorship crusader. While he 
could truthfully claim to have put a few over on the censorship board, even he would 
admit that some successful battles did not bring him anywhere close to winning the war. 
“It was seldom, indeed, that our leading articles were not hacked and mutilated in such a 
way as to make them almost meaningless,” lamented the Times in the beautifully-written 
editorial “Out of the Shadows.”8 While the language may be a bit hyperbolic, the 
complaint is largely accurate.
Readers of the Irish Times could understand the war only through their own 
interpretation of official government communiqués and censorship-approved statements. 
That articles be unbiased was more important to the censorship than that they be nuanced, 
informative, analytical, or educational. When a major event took place in the war, often 
the way it was represented in the newspaper was by two unaltered press releases, one 
from the British and one from the Germans, each with its own spin on the story, if not its 
own version of the story.
On November 5, 1940, a Tuesday, the major news from the war in Europe was 
that the Germans had managed to sink British ships. An Irish Times reader received this 
information in the form of two side-by- side official accounts. From the United Kingdom:
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The Board of Admiralty regret to announce that the armer merchant cruisers 
H.M.S. Laurentic (Captain E.P. Vivian, R.N.R.) and H.M.S. Patroclus
(Captain G.C. Wynter, R.N.) have been torpedoed and sunk. Reports so far 
indicate that the following numbers of survivors have been rescued by H.M. 
ships…
Under the headline “GERMAN FIGURES FOR BRITISH LOSSES,” the German News 
Agency’s communiqué read: “A German submarine has sunk the two British auxiliary 
cruisers Laurentic (18,724 tons) and the Patroclus (11,314 tons), and the armed British 
merchantman Casanare (5,376 tons).”9
An article was unacceptable unless it included a presentation of the views of each 
side or a balancing of the two. This occasionally led to headlines such as:
CLAIM BY GERMAN HIGH COMMAND
British Convoy Sunk
NO CONFIRMATION IN LONDON10
Impartiality also meant that the Irish Times must treat Adolf Hitler in the same 
fashion as it did Winston Churchill, despite the obvious difference in its feelings about 
the two. The censorship would not accept the leaders of the belligerents being referred to 
by any name but their formal titles. Therefore, the Irish Times spoke respectfully of “Herr 
Hitler” and even attempted to balance the praise it dispensed by referring to the Fuhrer’s 
“dynamic personality.” The Times professed in an editorial early in the war that “[t]he 
Germans have every right to play their cards in the most advantageous way” to achieve 
their goal, “the final destruction of the British Empire.”11 
If writing such editorials was not hard enough for the pro-British paper, the Times
was forced to use its ink and paper in order to pass along to the Irish people Hitler’s 
messages to his loyal soldiers. Under the headline “HERR HITLER’S ORDER OF THE 
DAY: ‘AN INDOMITABLE ADVANCE,’” the Times printed his message to troops in 
Norway. “You have accomplished the mighty task which I had to impose on you, 
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believing in you and your strength,” it read, “I am proud of you. Through me the nation
expresses its thanks to you.”12 The written statement even included Hitler’s awarding of a 
medal to a General von Falkenhorst.
The Times’ coverage of the war did not reveal much. With stilted official 
language and raw statistics which were not interpreted, these articles made the terrible, 
all-consuming violence of the struggle taking place a short distance from Ireland seem 
almost boring. By comparison, national stories like fires or murders were treated with 
emotion and detailed analysis. The Offaly Murder Trial of 1943 led to headlines such as 
“SWEETHEART’S VAIN WAIT FOR LOVER,” and stories written with flair. “[S]he 
waited three hours for her lover…but he did not turn up, and she never saw him later,” 
wrote the Irish Times reporter covering the story. “[S]he waited at home, stood at her 
front door, and walked down a number of streets…She had expressed to [an onlooker] 
the belief that she would never see Laurence again.”13 Considering the difference 
between the coverage of the war and that of the trial, readers could scarcely be blamed if 
they cared more about the outcome of the latter.
While the form that articles about World War II and the way they were presented 
and interpreted was determined by the censorship, so too, in some cases, was the actual 
content of the articles. There was no mention of the fact that many Irish citizens had 
volunteered to fight for the Allies, nor was it reported when they died in battle – unless 
Smyllie was up to his tricks, not even their obituaries could mention their service. 
Newspapers were also forbidden from mentioning the deaths of Irish citizens living in 
England during the Battle of Britain bombings. Mention of some events which did not 
involve Ireland or its citizens was also banned because these stories were deemed to be of 
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“inherent propagandist nature.”14 These events included the destruction of churches or 
hospitals.
The pictures in the Irish Times were not much more informative than the articles. 
Generally one war picture a day made it onto the newspaper’s pages. It usually was an 
image of bombed-out stores or buildings somewhere in Britain, with a caption like 
“COVENTRY AIR RAID: A SCENE of devastation, in what was once a busy shopping 
centre, after the recent air raid on Coventry.”15 These photographs showed that the war 
was indeed taking place, but they were hardly provocative. They showed the physical 
effects of a bomb, but said little about causes or deeper effects, such as those on the 
people of the area.
The only true opinions on the war which could be found in the pages of the Irish
Times were those of government leaders, notably Eamon de Valera. Even these were, of 
course, quite unbiased. Mainly, Dev’s public speeches focused on the good of neutrality 
and the importance of sustaining it. These statements were reported in full, word-for-
word, without any commentary. Under a headline such as “MORE CRITICAL TIMES 
AHEAD; MR. DE VALERA ON WAR MENACE,” the Times would print the 
taoiseach’s call for more young men to join the Irish armed forces in order to protect their 
country’s neutrality.16 If one read the articles of the Irish Times to learn what was going 
on with the war in Europe, one might get the basic facts and the commentary of the 
taoiseach, but little else.
The Irish Times also had its editorial page. It may seem odd that the paper was 
allowed to write editorials about the war in Europe – after all, newspapers generally use 
editorials to give their opinions on important issues of the day. If the Times could not 
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share its opinion, which it clearly could not, how could it publish editorials regarding the 
war? It did so by taking on the personality of an unconcerned but interested observer, 
commenting on noteworthy aspects of the war but rarely making explicit judgments on 
whether they were good or bad, praiseworthy or condemnable. By doing so, the Irish 
Times managed to provide its readers with one editorial about the war almost every day 
for the duration of the “Emergency.”
In the early days of World War II, a careful reading of Irish Times editorials 
sometimes revealed a subtle bias. This was the case on November 11, 1940 in “Hopes 
Deferred”:
It is a loss not only of life and treasure, but of moral strength, which
cannot be replaced. Secular standards are disappearing. Christian ideals
are being submerged in the barbaric tide of human frenzy; and those
who remember the surging hopes of two and twenty years ago are driven
almost to despair. Yet, amid all the fury and the tumult, above all the
shrieking and the snarls, one has the feeling – vague, struggling, and
groping as it may be – that a greater purpose is being served, and that the
new world – our children’s world – will be better.17
The first half of this section is typical of war-time editorials in the Times. It denounces 
the war, speaks, in the abstract, of its horrors, and makes the reader feel lucky to live in a 
neutral country. The second half (beginning at “Yet…”), however, would be difficult to 
interpret any other way than as an affirmation of support for the Allied cause. A bloody 
stalemate certainly would not serve a “greater purpose,” and it is clear that the Times does 
not believe an Axis victory would lead to a better world for the coming generation.
The Irish Times also got away with choices such as entitling an editorial on the 
major victory by the Greeks over the Italians at Koritza “David and Goliath.”18 Certainly, 
in a country as deeply Christian as Ireland, comparing the Allied force with David and 
38
the Axis power with the evil giant Goliath could have, and was likely intended to, signify 
more than an upset win. The Times also spoke of the Allies’ miraculously successful 
retreat from Dunkirk in glowing terms, asserting that “[t]he story of this little force’s 
performance in Belgium and Northern France must be numbered among the most brilliant 
feats of arms in modern history,” and, in an editorial entitled “The Allies’ Resolve,” 
predicting that the victory would “shine forth from the pages of history as an unequalled 
example of Franco-British heroism.”19
In October of 1941, the Times even offered some thinly-veiled criticism of the 
government’s censorship policy by comparing Irish neutrality with American neutrality. 
“[T]he officials charged with the maintenance of the country’s attitude have prevented 
any indication of sympathy with one side rather than another,” wrote the Irish Times of 
its own country,
They [neutrals] may start with a keener appreciation of the rules and a
stricter desire to observe them than any of the belligerents, but usually the
extent of their neutrality, or the meaning that they attach to neutrality, will
vary with the sympathies that they feel for one side or the other or with
the repercussions that the war seems likely to have upon their own future
or security.20
This sounds like a call for a policy more like that of the United States, one of open 
support for the British, or at least an end to censorship so that those who do favor one 
side can express their opinions.
Ironically, the end of America’s neutrality was followed by less biased, less 
emotional editorials in the pages of the Irish Times. The attack on Pearl Harbor was 
reported, of course, by publishing the official White House statement (“The Japanese 
have attacked Pearl Harbour from the air, and all naval and military activities on the
island of Oahu, the principal base in the Hawaiian Islands”21). The Times described the 
39
attack as a “daring raid” and did not include President Roosevelt’s “day that will live in 
infamy” quote.22 The editorial of December 8, 1941 was remarkably detached. Entitled 
“Japan at War” – an odd headline in that it makes no mention of America – its most 
important statement read: “From now onwards the student of events will follow them not 
on the map of Russia, of Libya, or of all Europe, but on his map of the world.”23 This was 
how the Times presented itself in the days and months that followed – a cool, intrigued 
observer anxious to see what would happen but caring not to make moral judgments 
either way.
Ireland’s relationship with the United States was a special one. Even de Valera, 
the architect of “moral neutrality,” acknowledged that the people of Ireland felt a 
particularly strong kind of sympathy for America and would be a “friendly” neutral 
toward it. It seems probable that the government realized an American entry into the war 
would make many Irish people rethink their own country’s stance. A logical response 
would have been to redouble the efforts of the censorship, taking an even stricter 
approach toward what newspapers would be allowed to print. The Irish Times itself 
acknowledged in a December 15 editorial that “the maintenance of Irish neutrality 
becomes more precarious accordingly as more and more nations are drawn into the 
war.”24 Although the United States is not mentioned by name, the meaning seems clear. 
Whether the Irish Times took it upon itself to protect neutrality or experienced added 
pressure from the government, Pearl Harbor seemed to be a turning point in the rigidity 
of war-time censorship.
For the couple years that followed, the Irish Times seemed a good soldier in the 
government’s attempt to continue neutrality in Ireland. Its articles on the war were cold, 
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emotionless, fact-driven. Its editorials, on the other hand, became more passionate and 
poetic at times. They always attacked the war in general, however, never blaming one 
side or the other for the suffering. An editorial called “Days of Doom” labeled the war as 
“the greatest military conflict of all time” and claimed that “[t]he world is watching these 
prodigious events with bated breath…This hour is one of the most solemn and tragic 
hours in human history. Mankind’s destiny had been flung upon a cruel hazard.”25 This 
highly dramatic language was not rare – in fact, the next day the Times wrote that “we 
may be witnessing something very close to the end of that world in which our generation 
had been reared.”26
As the end of the war approached and it became clear that the Allies would 
prevail, the Irish Times did less to hide its sympathies. Upon Hitler’s death, an editorial 
declared that “[h]istory had reached one of its decisive moments” and went on to say that 
“every German fighting man took a personal oath to the Fuhrer…the death of their 
leader…cannot but tear the heart out of their resistance.”27 The Soviets’ victory in Berlin 
was hailed as “highly positive news.”28 The word “tremendous” was used in editorials to 
describe the news of Hitler’s death and the moment of the Allies’ victory.29 While the 
Times certainly could have claimed it was using the word in the sense of “very 
important,” it is hard to believe that it was not meant to communicate the paper’s joy 
about these events.
It does not take a conspiracy theorist to find a bias on the Irish Times editorial 
page, even under censorship. The lifting of censorship, though, gave some insight into 
what the Times’ editorials might have been like had they not required government 
approval. “[O]ur fervent prayer,” wrote the Times, was that “God, in His goodness, would 
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give final victory to allied arms.” Describing the feeling of emerging from war- time 
censorship, the Times put it well: “We feel as anybody must feel who, having been 
confined in a dark cell for nearly six years, is released suddenly into the sunshine and 
blinded by the light.”30 The Times almost immediately began running a series of war 
photographs that had been censored under the title “THEY CAN BE PUBLISHED 
NOW.”31
The Irish Times battled against censorship though it knew it to be a losing cause, 
and supported the British endeavor when it could although it was only a token effort. It 
firmly believed in its mission to present the truth to the people of Ireland, as well as its 
own interpretation of those events, and was frustrated that it could not do so during a time 
as important as World War II. Through its editorials, it tried to keep people informed in 
the best way that it could: from the point of view of an absolutely unbiased, unfeeling 
“student of events.”
The Irish Times was passionately devoted to providing the Irish people with 
information and passionately opposed to censorship. Yet even it ultimately played into 
the government’s vision of moral neutrality. Censorship kept the newspaper from, in any 
significant way, communicating its belief that one belligerent was morally superior to the 
other. No media outlet could have believed this to be true any more strongly than the pro-
British Dublin paper, and yet a close examination of its pages reveals, for the most part, 
only hints that its editor and staffers were fervently praying for an Allied victory. This is 
strong evidence that the censorship was quite effective in not just securing military 
neutrality but in laying the groundwork for moral neutrality among the Irish people as 
well.
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The era of World War II was a time in which newspapers were relied upon 
heavily for information. Without this source of accurate information and intelligent 
opinion, it is hard to imagine that many Irish citizens truly had the evidence necessary to 
make a decision about where they stood on neutrality. The Irish Times presented the 
belligerents in an amoral fashion and presented the war itself as immoral. The war was 
bad; all the nations taking part in it were just as bad as each other; Ireland was good for 
staying out of it. At times intentionally, at times because it was forced, this was the
picture of the war given by the Times. To a reader in the early 1940s, neutrality, both 
military and moral, would have seemed like a pretty good idea.
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The Irish People: Was Neutrality Their Will?
Having examined the leadership of Ireland during World War II and the unique 
way in which information was treated in the country during that time period, it is now 
time to consider the Irish people. They are the ones who were led by Eamon de Valera 
and chose to approve of his decisions by continually reelecting him. They are also the 
ones who processed and acted on the messages about the war which were delivered 
through the media. The people of Ireland not only accepted neutrality, they in large part 
embraced it as a patriotic policy, a morally right policy, and – most important – their 
policy. How did this happen? Why did this happen?
There are few nations which are identified more closely with their religion than 
Ireland. For many people, mention of Ireland immediately brings to mind the violence 
between Catholics and Protestants which has often plagued the island. Irish Catholicism 
is regarded as its own unique and potent category of one of the world’s major religions. 
Religious beliefs seem to have had an impact on nearly every important occurrence 
during the country’s turbulent history. World War II neutrality is no exception.
For a nation which is not a theocracy, the relevance of God to political debate in 
Ireland is fairly astounding. During the “Emergency” years of the early 1940s, when 
Europe was experiencing its second great war, it was a fair assumption that most people 
in Ireland were strongly religious and that a substantial percentage of this group would 
not separate their religious beliefs from their political ones. They could not be blamed for 
associating religion with politics and especially political violence. The Irish people of the 
World War II era lived in an atmosphere of religious tension that had been inflamed by 
centuries of conflict between the Protestants – who were, of course, generally aligned 
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with the British oppressors – and the Catholics who made up the majority of the Irish 
population. Not only were the Irish a devout people, they were accustomed to viewing 
political matters through the lens of religion.
Eamon de Valera, taoiseach of Ireland during the Emergency, was certainly aware 
of this. There is no reason to believe that his frequent public references to God were not 
sincere and based on his own faith, but this does not mean they were not politically savvy 
as well. Dev’s addresses during the war often used language which suggested that the 
Irish were a type of chosen people who had wandered through the desert and been tested 
but now were close to reaching the Promised Land of an independent, united homeland. 
God had not made it easy for them or their ancestors, but he was now protecting them and 
using them to show the world how he wanted people to act, some of Dev’s statements 
seemed to imply. “God has been pleased to save us during the years of the war that have 
already passed,” said the taoiseach in a 1941 address, “We pray that He may be pleased 
to save us to the end.”1 The message was not that God was saving Ireland out of pity or 
simple benevolence, but because it was doing the right thing by refusing to take part in 
the violence of the war.
Of course, two could play the game of claiming the religious high ground. Allied 
propaganda suggested that the war was a Christian Crusade to save Europe and its 
innocent people from the evil clutches of Hitler and Mussolini. This point of view was 
not without support in Ireland – it was most famously propounded by James Dillon, as 
will be seen below. De Valera, though, bristled at the notion that his country was showing 
some lack of Christian strength by not joining the British and their allies in taking up 
arms against the fascists. Censorship in Ireland assured that the opposing sides in the war 
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were regarded as moral – or immoral – equals. Besides, how could the Allies be doing the 
work of Christianity while at the same time cooperating with the Soviet Union, backers 
of neutrality asked? The banning of religion was a part of the communist program and, 
not surprisingly, was the aspect many Irish focused on. If it was dubious for the British to 
claim they were carrying out a Christian Crusade, it was downright absurd for the Soviets 
to do so. There were those among the Irish people who went so far as to admire fascist 
states for the central role they gave to religion. This was evidenced by the number of Irish 
who supported Francisco Franco’s bid to take over Spain, a coup which was carried out 
under the banner of Catholicism and anti-communism.
Still, many religious people did believe that God was firmly on the side of the 
Allies in their attempts to defeat the Axis powers. These included a significant number of 
priests and religious leaders. While the office of the censorship could not keep these 
priests from sharing their views from the altar, the government did, in fact, impose 
censorship on religious publications in the same way that it did other newspapers and 
magazines. In a country noted for its respect for the Church, this was a bold step. It was 
also an understandable one – the opinion of the Church was likely to have a great impact 
on the people. In an era during which questioning the correctness of the Church’s view 
would have been unthinkable for many people, religious leaders could have seriously 
harmed the government’s attempt to obtain widespread public support of their policy with 
a high-profile broadside against neutrality. De Valera’s government was not going to risk 
this, even if protecting against it meant taking the audacious step of censoring the 
Church.
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James Dillon emerged as the most vocal, unabashed enemy of neutrality among 
Ireland’s politicians. While most of the rank and file supported neutrality out of either 
belief in its benefits or acceptance that it could not be changed, the deputy leader of the 
Fine Gael party publicly aired his conscience when it came to the policy. De Valera’s 
government was not going to seriously consider abandoning neutrality. Nor did there 
seem to be much point to debating a policy which enjoyed such widespread approval in 
the court of public opinion. Dillon chose to ignore these facts in 1941, when things began 
to look bleak for the Allies on the battlefields of Europe, and made his opposition to 
neutrality quite clear. Dillon went against majority opinion as well as the official stance 
of his own party, Fine Gael, which seems to have had a negative orientation toward 
neutrality privately but did not have the political will to come out against it.
On July 17, in front of the Dail Eireann, Dillon delivered one of the most fiery, 
impassioned, eloquent speeches in his country’s history. He pulled no punches in his 
attack on Irish neutrality. “I say that it is not in the true interest, moral or material, of the 
Irish people,” said Dillon. The speech focused more on the former as it built to its climax:
[O]n the side of the Anglo-American Alliance is right and justice and on the
side of the Axis is evil and injustice. And I say that it is our affair, inasmuch
as resistance to evil and injustice is the affair of every Christian State and
every Christian man in this world…
I say that it is not doubt as to the right and wrong of the moral issues in this 
struggle that deters us from making the right decision now. It is fear of the 
German blitz that deters us…
I believe that we have an opportunity of fulfilling our high destiny and
proving our loyalty and devotion to things higher than material property and 
political considerations.
Dillon’s speech did not ignore Ireland’s “material” interests or the practical 
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reasons for neutrality completely, but its primary goal was to appeal to the religious and 
moral beliefs of the Irish people. Throughout his address, Dillon used language which 
was loaded with meaning for the strongly Catholic people of the Republic of Ireland. He 
did this most explicitly and most effectively by comparing neutral Ireland to the man 
Christians believe, through his cowardly refusal to take a stand, was partly responsible 
for the death of Jesus. “At present we act the part of Pontius Pilate in asking as between 
the Axis and the Allies, ‘What is truth?’ and washing our hands and calling the world to 
witness that this is no affair of ours,” Dillon scolded.
Not only did Dillon argue that the Irish people’s religion demanded that they fight 
evil and injustice, he attempted to debunk Eamon de Valera’s assertion that the war was 
not a “Christian Crusade” because fighting on the same side as the Christians of England, 
France, and America were the godless communists of the Soviet Union. Said Dillon:
I say – and I say it on the authority of Our Holy Father the Pope – that
Germany in every small country which she has conquered has sought, not
only to establish political domination, but to impose on the conquered 
peoples an atheist church which derides Christianity and which forbids the
people of those States to serve God according to their consciences.
Dillon acknowledged that the forced atheism of the Soviet Union was disturbing to him 
as to other Christians. But the fascist system which had provided the blueprint for the 
totalitarian order of the USSR – Dillon called Nazi Germany the “prototype” for Soviet 
Russia – was an even more dreadful evil. “Let those who feel with me that there is only 
one thing more loathsome than Communism in the world not suffer their minds to be 
confused by the fact that Soviet Russia is fighting Germany now,” implored Fine Gael’s 
vice president. “The utmost endeavor of all Christian men is requisite if the Nazi threat to 
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Christianity is to be repelled,” proclaimed Dillon, “aid for Great Britain and the United 
States from this country is called for on spiritual and material grounds.”2
Dillon’s speech was, as a political move, rash and foolish. He overstepped his 
bounds by going against the party of which he was a top member, offended some of the 
country’s most powerful leaders, and left the many supporters of neutrality little choice 
but to respond in full force – after all, he had not only questioned their manhood and 
courage but their Christianity. Nor did the address achieve its most important, if lofty, 
goal. Ireland did not take up arms alongside the Allies, even if it did provide military and
intelligence support behind the scenes. On the simplest level, the speech could be 
considered disastrous: the policy which Dillon argued against remained firmly in place 
and he himself was forced to resign because it made him persona non grata in Ireland’s 
highest political circles. Despite this, the speech has only grown in admiration in the 
decades since it was uttered.
Part of this admiration, of course, is due to the beauty of Dillon’s passionate, 
masterful rhetoric. But it is what he said, and not how he said it, that makes this particular 
speech so memorable. It would be difficult to find a more intensely moralistic oration 
outside of a house of worship. Eamon de Valera’s references to God and religion in his 
speeches defending neutrality were not understated in their own right, but Dillon outdid 
him with religious language that is about as subtle as a jackhammer. If the taoiseach was 
going to argue for neutrality on the basis of Christian morality, Dillon was going to fire 
all the religious artillery he possessed to fight for the moral high ground and convince the 
people of the Irish nation that neutrality was not the role that God had envisioned for 
them.
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Geoffrey Roberts observes that “de Valera’s ‘constructive ambiguity’ was not 
only a matter of policy but of principles and of values as well.” “Completely absent from 
de Valera’s speeches is any sense of the great moral and political issues of the Second 
World War,” he writes. Roberts describes one way the Irish experience of the war can be 
related as “a narrative of what could be called ‘the neutrality of moral indifference’.” He 
relates that the Washington Post commented at the time on the “moral myopia” which 
Ireland had imposed on itself during the war years.3 This way of viewing neutral Ireland 
is quite misleading. After reading the speeches of de Valera and Dillon, it is difficult to 
give credence to the assertion that their nation was morally indifferent during the 
Emergency years.
De Valera did, of course, make it his policy to morally equate the Allies and Axis 
powers and, more important, forced others with a broad public audience to do the same. 
He did not believe neutrality to be a policy of moral indifference, though. Far from it; 
Dev saw neutrality as a policy of moral goodness and uprightness. Dillon, on the other 
hand, saw it as a policy of moral weakness and even sin. Censorship may have meant that 
there was little public discussion regarding which warring party was right and which was 
wrong, but the decision to remain neutral was argued for, and against, on moral grounds.
James Dillon could have argued that Ireland should enter the war in order to 
please the United States and gain the rewards of a closer friendship with the world’s 
greatest political and military power. He could have argued that joining the war would 
mean a better relationship with Britain, which would increase the likelihood of coming to 
a favorable agreement on ending partition. Instead, he appealed to what was most 
important to the Irish people, namely, their religion and the way it suggested they should 
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live their lives as a people and a nation. De Valera had shrewdly established this as the 
battlefield on which the debate about neutrality would take place, and Dillon accepted the 
terms and fired back with the same weapons the taoiseach had chosen. When it came to 
winning over the Irish people, the opponents agreed, appealing to their sense of morality,
which had been well-developed by their religion and their history, was the way to do it.
The Irish people were not as one-dimensional in their thinking as it may appear. 
They did take into account the political causes and effects of their nation’s decision not to 
take part in the war going on in Europe. The most important of these were the ones 
having to do with Ireland’s relationship with England. Neutrality, like most any other 
major decision made by the government, was judged in part by what effect it had on 
Ireland’s struggle for an end to partition. Riding high on the recent victory of convincing 
the British to finally pull their ships out of the Republic and cede complete control of the 
ports to the Irish government, it was easy to see the decision to remain neutral as a defiant 
statement of Ireland’s newfound strength.
“[P]eople perceived neutrality as the acid test of sovereignty,” argues John A. 
Murphy.4 If Ireland could stand up to Britain and flatly decline any request they made for 
military help, then it would seem to indicate that the balance of power had changed. Out 
of context, an independent country’s freedom not to participate in a war is taken as a 
given. But the Irish had not experienced having this option. This is not to say that support 
for neutrality was based on the mentality of a rebellious teenager – not wanting to do 
something just because one is told he should – but it was significant to the Irish that they 
could turn the British down if they chose to do so. Resentment towards the British ran 
deep in Ireland. Neutrality was not just psychologically important because they would not 
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be doing what the British wanted, but because this was now a viable choice. Before, 
standing up to England meant starting a war. Now, they could stand up to their 
oppressors by pursuing a peaceful strategy.
For a modern person looking back at the Second World War, it may seem odd that 
it was one of the Allies that Ireland felt the need to stand up to. After all, it is now very 
clear that Britain and company were in the right, even if they were neither blameless 
when it came to the state of affairs in Europe nor completely honorable in their 
prosecution of the war campaign. It does not seem that the benefit of retrospect should be 
needed to recognize the evil of Nazi Germany. Many Irish people – including the 
architect of neutrality, Eamon de Valera – recognized that it would be better for the world 
if the democracies won out in the end.
It must be remembered that the people knew much more about the evils of Britain 
than they did about the evils of Germany. Britain was the neighbor who had made life 
more difficult for the Irish for generations. England was geographically close and at the 
center of the political consciousness of the Irish people. Germany was much farther away 
and much more culturally different. Familiarity breeding contempt towards the Germans 
was not a possibility. Also, the Irish people – like many people in countries which did not 
impose censorship – did not know just how bad the Nazis were until the war had ended 
and Allied troops marched into the death camps to discover their horrifying secrets. 
“Holocaust denial was official policy” in Ireland. 5 The lack of good information about 
what was going on inside Germany combined with the censorship dictate preventing the 
publication of anything which was inherently likely to turn people against one side or the 
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other meant that the people did not get to see the worst of Nazi Germany until the Allies 
had won the war and censorship was lifted.
Murphy goes on to make an even bolder claim about how important the choice of 
this policy was for Ireland at the time: “Wartime neutrality was the formative experience
in the history of the State.”6 It may seem odd that neutrality – which is defined by not
doing something – could be a formative experience. In Murphy’s view, however, the Irish 
people turned what seems like an inherently passive policy into a very active one. 
Neutrality meant staying out of the fight which was taking place between the Axis and 
the Allies, but, to the people, it was also a part of the fight which Ireland had been 
participating in for centuries. This notion was encouraged by Eamon de Valera, who 
connected the Irishmen of his time with the freedom fighters of the past on more than one 
occasion.
Neutrality was a unifying force, especially early on. It was a hugely popular 
policy championed by a charismatic leader. It was a way for Ireland to stand up to the 
bully who had been pushing it around for centuries without shedding blood. Supporting 
neutrality was good for Ireland – not just because it meant staying out of a war which was 
not of their causing and avoiding the costs in lives and money which would be required, 
but because it was a revolutionary chance to exercise sovereignty. Even if Ireland was 
doing nothing, the fact that it could now say “no” was enough. It may not sound like 
much, but the Irish were not even certain of this – one did not have to be a conspiracy 
theorist to believe that the English would use force to try to take their ports back now that 
a war was underway. Nevertheless, de Valera was standing up to Britain and the people 
53
were largely more than willing to stand with him. Not only was neutrality morally right, 
it was patriotic.
Despite the extremely positive way in which neutrality was viewed by many, 
support for it was by no means universal. James Dillon was not a lone voice crying in the 
wilderness; there were many who agreed with parts or the whole of what he said. If there 
had not been, he would not have been seen as a danger and might have been treated with 
amusement rather than concern by those in power. Despite Eamon de Valera’s assertions 
that neutrality represented the will of the people, even he and members of his government 
could not have taken this to be guaranteed.
Dillon’s impassioned verbal salvos against the policy of neutrality, discussed 
above, were not the only hint that the Irish people were less than one hundred percent on 
board with their government’s policy. A powerful reminder that there were many in 
Ireland who did not believe de Valera’s choice was the right choice for them was the 
stream of young Irish men leaving the country to fight in Europe. If their own country 
was not going to fight, they would take up arms under the banner of England, despite 
what must have been some ambivalence in most cases. Mixed feelings about the British 
did not stop tens of thousands of Irishmen from risking their lives for the Allied cause, 
however. As many as 70,000 or more may have been present on the battlefields of 
Europe, sacrificing their safety for something they were told those at home did not 
believe in.
Some organizations did crack the censorship regime to recruit Irish volunteers, 
but for the most part these men made individual, independent decisions based on their 
own feelings and maybe those of their family or friends. For the most part, these men 
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were typical Southern Catholics – relatively few were Protestants who enlisted in the 
British armed forces out of a religious or cultural solidarity with the people of England. 
In fact, the British military during World War II likely included more Catholic volunteers 
from the South of Ireland than it did Protestant volunteers from the North. A joke at the 
time went that neither the South nor the North wanted it revealed how many of their men 
were fighting in Europe, because the South wanted people to believe that it was not in the 
war and the North wanted people to believe that it was.7
While de Valera’s government did not acknowledge the volunteers, few people 
begrudged them their personal decisions. The volunteers were not seen as disloyal; in 
fact, most of the Irish understood their way of thinking if they did not feel the need to do 
the same thing themselves. “[T]here was broad sympathy for the allied cause,” asserts 
Alvin Jackson in a recent history of modern Ireland.8 Geoffrey Roberts backs up this 
claim with evidence from the time. A 1942 British political intelligence report which he 
describes as “even-handed” reported that “the overwhelming majority of the people are 
clearly pro-British at heart in the present struggle.” The American Office of Strategic 
Studies agreed in a 1943 report that “it can be said quite truthfully that the sympathies of 
the vast majority of the people are on the side of the Allies.”9 If the Irish people 
supported the Allies – some strongly enough to risk their lives in order to help them win 
the war – why did they accept their government’s policy of neutrality so readily?
The answer is simple, if surprising: many of the Irish people saw personal support 
for the Allied cause as wholly compatible with support for de Valera and his policy of 
neutrality. The taoiseach had acknowledged that each person could have his own 
sympathies but this did not mean the nation had to. Remarkably, this break between 
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private feelings and political decisions seems to have worked rather smoothly. One would 
guess that those who wanted the Allies to win the war so badly that they would fight for 
another country’s armed forces must have resented the fact that their own homeland 
would not enter the war. In fact, this does not seem to have been the case. “[M]assive 
recruitment to the British army was compatible with popular support for de Valera,” 
Jackson writes. Roberts explains further:
The volunteers’ reasons for joining up were as varied and diverse as one
would expect from any cohort of young people: adventure, employment,
money, family tradition, a sense of patriotic duty. Explicit political motives
for volunteering – anti- fascism, for example – did not figure prominently in
most cases but it seems clear that the volunteers were not unsympathetic to
the cause they were fighting and that they did not share the hostility to
Britain and the Brits of some of their compatriots. As to Irish neutrality
most volunteers supported it and saw no contradiction between their service
for the allied cause and other patriotic obligations.10
Censorship and the way the war was presented by the Irish government meant that 
even many of the volunteers likely did not take a strong moral stance on the war. Fighting 
was something they chose to do for themselves, not something they did because they 
were disgusted their country was failing to do so.
A major reason that support for the Allies never translated into a unified political 
movement against neutrality was a glaring lack of leadership. James Dillon was not the 
only member of Fine Gael to support Irish entry into the war; many agreed with him, and 
some even said so publicly (many of them after the war was over). The anti-neutrality 
stance of much of Fine Gael behind closed doors never became public in a significant 
way, though. The party leadership saw neutrality as a losing battle – challenging the 
popular de Valera on something he held so sacred would not be productive. If Fine Gael 
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would not get behind Dillon and launch an attack on the government’s policy, nobody 
would.
One must presume that if support for the Allies were strong enough, though, 
leaders would have emerged. There would have been somebody, or somebodies, willing 
to risk the wrath of the government if the movement looked like it could have success. 
There must be some other reason why the Irish people continued to support neutrality 
although they wanted the Allies to win the war. There is some evidence that after the 
United States declared war, as many as two out of three Irish citizens would have 
supported a decision to follow the Americans into the fray.11 Still, a strong anti-neutrality 
movement did not coalesce. It seems clear that the Irish people believed neutrality was 
their policy, even if the individual opinions of the majority sometimes went against it.
Donal O Drisceoil believes that censorship is the piece of the equation which 
makes this all add up. He argues that this policy meant not only the lack of certain 
information in Ireland, but that it essentially functioned as pro-neutrality propaganda. 
With only cold, emotionless facts reported about the belligerents, it was easy for them to 
be morally equated. Meanwhile, only positive statements about neutrality were allowed –
the government showed just how serious it was about this when it went so far as to censor 
the Church when it questioned neutrality. The effect of this was to convince the Irish 
people that neutrality was both the right policy and a policy which they had chosen, not 
which had been imposed on them.
“Negative propaganda has been defined as ‘the selective control of information to 
favour a particular viewpoint,’ which captures neatly a primary objective of the 
Emergency censors,” O Drisceoil writes.12 By keeping out of the public consciousness 
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anything that gave a positive view of either the Allies or of the Axis powers, the 
government assured that the only propaganda which would have a significant effect 
would be its own glorification of neutrality as courageous, patriotic, morally upright, and 
spiritually laudable.
Propaganda favoring both sides was present in war-time Ireland. British 
newspapers were allowed as long as they did not directly criticize neutrality – which they 
rarely did for fear of alienating more Irish people than they already had. In fact, when the 
Irish government was accused of keeping its people in the dark, those behind censorship 
pointed out that material supporting both sides was available. “Towards the end of the 
war, in the context of the horrifying reports from the liberated concentration camps, the 
censors claimed that the Irish people had been kept ‘fully informed’ of atrocities and 
other aspects of the war by means of belligerent broadcasts,” O Drisceoil says. But, he 
observes, “This is highly questionable…belligerent propaganda was available to those 
who wished to seek it out, and propaganda that is sought out usually ‘preaches’ to the 
already ‘converted’ or those who wish to be converted.”13
More important to the average Irish person than the government’s tolerance of 
some propaganda was its control of the country’s own media. By keeping a strict watch 
over the newspapers and other media outlets, the censorship assured that nobody within 
Ireland would be offering any support for one side or the other. While propaganda from 
Britain or Germany may have been allowed under certain circumstances, biased language 
in the Irish media was treated with the full force of the censorship’s creed, “If there’s 
doubt, cut it out.” “Propagandist terminology included terms such as the Battle of 
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Britain,” O Drisceoil writes, “which Frank Aiken personally rechristened ‘the air battle 
over Southern England and the Channel in 1940 for the benefit of Irish readers.”14
For the average Irish person, who may have felt sympathy for one side in the 
conflict but had no strong investment in it either way, sanitized reports including facts 
and figures and mind-bogglingly colorless terminology such as Aiken’s euphemistic
name for the Battle of Britain were the main source of information about the war. The 
British did not launch a pushy propaganda movement in Ireland for fear of backlash from 
a people who already held a grudge against them, and only the most vehement 
Anglophobe or anti-communist among the people would have been susceptible to pro-
Nazi literature. It seems unlikely that propaganda alone could have tipped the Irish people 
toward favoring the abandonment of neutrality. The potential for change caused by Allied 
or Axis propaganda does not seem very substantial.
What can be said with some confidence is that censorship made the Irish people 
more likely to support neutrality and made it much more unlikely that a broad movement 
to abandon neutrality would have been successful or even gotten started. As O Drisceoil 
puts it:
[T]he censorship was obviously a major hindrance to [the development of 
opposition], both in terms of excluding information which would help to
create, for example, anti-Nazi sentiment, and in blocking the efforts of
partisans to promote one side or the other or build arguments in favour of 
abandoning neutrality.15
Would a groundswell of popular support for entering the war have built up had it not 
been for the government’s strict control of the media? O Drisceoil hesitates to speculate 
that it would have, although he points out that the Irish people’s desire to see their 
country fight increased once America joined the war, and the idea likely would have been 
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even more popular once the Allies pushed the Germans back in Western Europe and the 
likelihood of an attack against Ireland became extremely low.
The intelligence of the Irish people should not be underestimated. It is easy to 
look back and believe that the government fooled the people into believing that the 
backroom decisions of Eamon de Valera and other elites were actually the will of the 
nation as a whole. But it was more complicated than this. De Valera told the people that 
he accepted that they would have their own personal sympathies, and they did. For the 
vast majority of them, this meant some measure of support for the Allied cause, even if it 
was balanced against dislike for and distrust of the British. But the Irish people also 
supported de Valera and neutrality, and, in general, did not see this as a contradiction. It 
would be better for Europe if the Allies won the war, but what was right for Ireland at 
this moment was neutrality.
Support for neutrality was not unanimous. Even among those who did support it, 
most did not do so blindly or without forming their own complex opinions. Censorship, 
even if it was used as a form of propaganda to convince the Irish people of the merits of 
neutrality – which it was – cannot be credited with duping the population into supporting 
a policy with which they disagreed. For most people, it was the right policy, at least for 
most of the war. But censorship was not irrelevant. Neutrality may have been accepted by 
the Irish people even had they received the whole truth about every atrocity and been
confronted with strongly opinionated and biased information each time they opened a 
newspaper or went to the movies. But support for it was solidified by the way in which 
the war and neutrality were written about and talked about. The pros of neutrality were 
expounded upon by the most influential and popular men in Ireland, while the cons could 
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not be mentioned. Neutrality likely would have survived deep into the war or even 
throughout the conflict without censorship; with censorship in place, there was almost no 
possibility that it would not.
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Conclusion
Unlike the more recent wars which have dominated our attention in recent months 
– notably, Iraq and Vietnam – World War II is seen not as a murky moral conundrum but 
a black-and-white, good-versus-evil situation, the perfect example of a just and necessary 
war. Thus, it is easy for a casual observer to be surprised that Ireland, close neighbor of 
Britain and close friend of the United States, did not take part in the fighting. The logical 
assumption is that Ireland’s decision to stay neutral must have been an amoral one based 
on practical calculations of what would be best for it alone. This assumption is false. In 
reality, Ireland was extremely concerned with the moral implications of its decision; the 
debate over whether neutrality was right was fought mostly on the battleground of 
morality, not political interests. Principle was at least as important a factor in Ireland’s 
decision to establish and passionately guard its neutrality as was pragmatism.
Eamon de Valera, one of the most influential and beloved leaders in the history of 
Ireland, was the architect of war-time neutrality. He believed that it was the practical 
decision which Ireland had to make but also the morally right decision.
There were many reasons why neutrality was necessary. Ireland’s military was by 
no means prepared to launch itself into an international conflict or defend its own soil 
against a strong air attack. An Irish declaration of war may have actually hurt the British 
by tempting the Axis powers to invade Ireland and thus gain a foothold right next door to 
England, while a publicly neutral Ireland could provide secret military and intelligence 
assistance. The British had just recently agreed to remove all their ships from Ireland’s 
ports, and the prospect of inviting them right back in was not appealing. For many Irish 
people, any cooperation was not appealing, and the most radically anti-English citizens, 
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most importantly those in the Irish Republican Army, may have revolted against the 
government if it formed a military alliance with the British.
De Valera admitted on at least one occasion that neutrality was a policy “of 
necessity.” Much more often, though, his speeches revolved around his twin emphases: 
that neutrality was the will of the people and that it was morally right. De Valera’s belief 
was that at this stage of Europe’s development, war should nearly always take a back seat 
to diplomacy. Even a year before the war, he clearly did not anticipate another European 
conflict in which an aggressive nation tried to take by force what did not belong to it. As 
the war got under way, the taoiseach made it obvious that neutrality would be his choice 
for Ireland. He had long favored neutrality, but he quickly began speaking of it not as his 
policy or that of his government but the policy of the people.
De Valera portrayed neutrality as the logical extension of Ireland’s ongoing 
struggle for freedom and independence and used religious language in portraying the 
Irish as a chosen people who were doing what was morally right by staying out of the 
war, while both the Allies and the Axis powers were wrong. The taoiseach was extremely 
popular, but he did not take it as a given that neutrality would succeed – he knew that he 
needed public support, and he wanted the people not just to accept his chosen policy but 
to embrace it and have pride in it.
The survival of neutrality was never taken for granted. The military’s ability to 
repel a German attack or keep the British from reclaiming Ireland’s ports was dubious. 
The government recognized that in order to protect neutrality, it would have to assure that 
neither belligerent was motivated to attack Ireland. Thus was born moral neutrality: 
publicly, the two sides in the war would be treated with absolute fairness and equality. 
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Censorship was imposed to make sure the media did not treat the Allies favorably at the 
expense of the Axis powers or vice versa. In practice, this meant that virtually no opinion 
on the actions of either side was safe from the eager protectors of moral neutrality at the 
censorship office.
Censorship had another intended effect, though. It was used to influence public 
opinion in favor of neutrality. Neutrality was presented in a good light: it meant standing 
up to the British and fulfilling God’s will for Ireland, doing what was morally right and 
what was right for the country. The media could not argue against neutrality, nor could it 
promote the cause of either side in the European war. Neutrality may have been the will 
of the people even had it not been for censorship, but the fact that no other options were 
fairly presented meant that the people had little choice in forming their will.
While de Valera’s government can be questioned and criticized for giving priority 
to defending neutrality over maintaining a healthy free press, one of the staples of 
democracy, the taoiseach’s commitment to the principles behind neutrality cannot be. 
This was made quite apparent by Dev’s visit to the German minister to pay his respects 
after the death of Adolf Hitler. This move was hugely unpopular in the Allied countries 
and in Ireland as well, and could have proved to be politically costly. But de Valera’s 
belief in Ireland’s neutrality would not be shaken by the threat of losing some of his vast 
popularity. De Valera believed neutrality to be the right policy, practically and morally, 
and would do whatever was necessary to defend it and convince the Irish people that he 
was leading them in the right direction.
Of course, the media could not be expected to take censorship lying down. As 
Ireland’s proudest newspaper and a staunch longtime supported of the British, the Irish 
64
Times seemed the best candidate to push back against the strict censorship which was 
used by the government to support neutrality. Censorship hurt newspapers. It kept them 
from printing the articles they wanted to print but also meant they had less to say – less to 
say meant fewer pages, fewer pages meant less income from advertisers.
R.M. Smyllie, editor of the Irish Times, had bigger problems with censorship than 
the financial harm it would cause his newspaper. Although he believed neutrality was the 
right choice for Ireland, he did not believe that censorship was necessary or acceptable. 
Smyllie saw the free press as a vital element of democracy, and claimed that the 
suspension of the free press usually signaled that a country’s democracy was not healthy 
– he pointed out that for many fascist regimes, the free press was the first thing to go 
when they took power. Smyllie tried to get the best information to the people of Ireland 
which he could under censorship, but he also saw the Irish Times’ fight against the 
censorship as a personal battle in which he tried to trick and outsmart the government 
agency whenever possible.
Although Smyllie may have savored some small victories against the censorship, 
the larger war was a lost cause. The Irish Times was forced to print “stories” about the 
war which were no more than the official communiqués from the governments of the 
warring nations. Although the paper’s writers were devoted Anglophiles, they had to treat 
Hitler in precisely the same manner as they did Winston Churchill. Coverage of the war 
was dry, dull, and minimally informative – a reader could not be blamed for putting the 
monumental events of Europe out of his mind to instead read of some more colorfully 
reported scandal or minor tragedy.
65
Censorship sometimes went as far as determining what was reported, not just how 
it was relayed. The participation of tens of thousands of Irish volunteers in the Allied 
militaries could not be reported. Neither could events which were inherently likely to 
draw an emotional reaction against one of the belligerents, such as the bombings of 
churches or hospitals.
The only true opinions found in the Irish Times came from the mouth of de 
Valera, whose speeches were reprinted in full without analytical commentary. The paper 
did manage to produce an editorial on the war nearly every day, but rather than providing 
the Times’ opinion, as an editorial normally would, it took on the tone of an unconcerned 
but intrigued observer, commenting on interesting aspects of the war but rarely making 
explicit judgments on whether they were good or bad.
Looking closely, a subtly bias can be found in many of the editorials from early in 
the war. The Irish Times even took the occasional veiled jab at the government’s 
censorship policy. With Pearl Harbor came a turning point. America’s entry into the war 
made it much more likely that the Irish people would question their own country’s 
neutrality. Whether the newspaper reined in itself or the censorship cracked down on 
them, signs of bias seemed to end as soon as the United States, perhaps Ireland’s closest 
friend among foreign nations, was drawn into the conflict. Interestingly, the Irish Times
editorial page began using more emotional and dramatic language as the Emergency 
dragged on, but only in attacking the war itself, not one combatant or another.
As the end result of World War II became apparent, the Irish Times began to 
show its true colors. Once censorship was lifted, it made clear just how fervently it had 
supported the Allies and just how frustrated it had been by the government’s censorship. 
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Behind the scenes, the Times had been hoping and praying for an Allied victory. Yet, its 
readers received a picture of the war which did not differentiate between the opposing 
forces when it came to right and wrong. If neutrality seemed a highly attractive option to 
them, this was undoubtedly one of the reasons why.
Reading the newspaper was not the only way in which the Irish people 
experienced the war. How did other aspects of their lives lead them to embrace de 
Valera’s policy of neutrality instead of questioning it?
Religion was a tremendously important part of the lives of most Irish people. 
Sometimes religious beliefs and political beliefs were hard to separate; when it came to 
their troubled relationship with England, the two often seemed to be one and the same. 
Referencing God in political speech was not uncommon, and de Valera did this often in 
his statements in support of neutrality as morally right. Allied propaganda followed the 
same tack, portraying the war as a Christian Crusade against the evil fascists. There was 
little hope of this idea catching on in Ireland, however – a coalition of the Protestant Brits 
who had so long oppressed their people and the atheist communists of the Soviet Union 
was not very believable when claiming to do God’s work. More worrisome to the Irish 
government was that the Church itself would come out against neutrality. So afraid was 
the government of the influence Church leaders could have on the Irish people that they 
boldly censored religious publications in the same manner as regular periodicals.
James Dillon, the most noteworthy opponent of neutrality, also showed that 
morality was the primary basis on which the people were expected to decide whether to 
support it. In a fiery speech, Dillon asserted that it was the Christian duty of the Irish 
people to join the Allies on the battlefields. De Valera and Dillon had different ideas of 
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what the Irish people should do, but they both argued for their plans on the basis that it 
was what God wanted of Ireland. Censorship may have required that the belligerents be 
morally equated, but Ireland was far from morally indifferent. If the Irish people’s leaders 
were any indication, morality was at the forefront of their thinking about neutrality.
Morality was not all the Irish people were concerned with, however. Neutrality 
represented a vital political statement for their nation. They could not stand up the British 
without the consequence of being crushed militarily. It may seem odd that in a war which 
involved some of the most evil regimes in European history, it was England which 
Ireland felt the need to stand up to. Yet it was also England with which Ireland’s affairs 
were constantly intertwined. The Irish people were far more aware of the evils which had 
been done by the British than those which had been done, and were being done, by the 
Germans. Neutrality was a way for Ireland to test its own sovereignty. If it could go 
against Britain’s desires on something so important, it truly was its own nation.
Despite these reasons, support for neutrality was not universal. The substantial 
number of volunteers who left the Republic of Ireland to fight for the Allies is an 
undeniable indication that many Irish people disagreed with their leadership and believed 
it was worth making serious sacrifices to help the Allied cause. Among those who did not 
take the drastic step of volunteering for the armed forces of another country, most felt at 
least some degree of sympathy for the Allies. This support for the Allies, though – even 
to the extreme that it motivated volunteering – was generally not seen as incompatible 
with support for de Valera and neutrality.
Why did pro-Ally feeling among the Irish people never translate into a movement 
against neutrality? For one, there was a lack of leadership for any such movement – few 
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were foolish enough to challenge the popular de Valera on a policy which he believed in 
so deeply. More important, though, was the role of censorship. It functioned as a kind of 
pro-neutrality propaganda tool, presenting the government’s policy in a favorable light 
while keeping information and opinions which supported either side in the great war out 
of the public consciousness for the most part. Since it was forbidden to criticize neutrality 
in the media, a strong anti-neutrality movement, improbable under any circumstances, 
would have found it nearly impossible to gain any momentum.
Morality was a deciding factor in whether war-time Irish neutrality would flourish 
or fail. The people’s belief that the government’s policy was morally right was crucial to 
their support of it. Ireland’s leader, Eamon de Valera, believed in neutrality for reasons of 
principle at least as much as practical reasons; through his portrayal of neutrality as a 
courageous, morally right decision he convinced many of the Irish people to believe in it 
as well. Censorship, along with fulfilling its stated goal of keeping the war off Ireland’s 
doorstep, functioned to reinforce the people’s support for neutrality by presenting it as the 
only viable option and equating the two sides which were at war. Neutrality was the will 
of the Irish people – that will, however, was not completely free.
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